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1 Introduction
Nowadays, with the fast development of mobile technologies, Global Mobility
Networks (GLOMONETs) have become widely available and interconnected.
To provide global roaming service for a mobile user, remote authentication
is an essential requirement. A typical remote authentication scenario involves
three parties, namely a Mobile User (MU), a Foreign Agent(FA) and a Home
Agent(HA). When a mobile user MU roams into a foreign network, the foreign
agent FA authenticates the roaming user with the help of the user’s home agent
HA[1,10, 11].
During the roaming process in GLOMONET, the mobile user MU is very
much concerned about its privacy protection. The user’s identity should be
protected and his/her location and activities should be kept unlinkable. It is
desirable to keep mobile users’ identities anonymous in the remote user authentication process. In recent years, many anonymous authentication scheme
(e.g.[22,12, 21, 2, 13,6, 14, 19, 7,8]) have been proposed for roaming services in
GLOMONET. However, most of the existing protocols were broken shortly
after they were proposed.
Mutual Authentication is a very important security feature. It requires
that the client and server prove their respective identities to each other before
performing any application functions. Recently, many research work(e.g.[22,
4, 8, 23, 24, 20]) have been done in the design and analysis of mutual authentication protocols. However, some of them have been proved to be insecure
against known attacks.
In 2012, Jiang et al. [9] pointed out the security ﬂaws in some previous
smart card based anonymous user authentication protocols. In order to remedy
those weaknesses, Jiang et al. proposed an authentication scheme based on
quadratic residue assumption, which is very eﬃcient. Hence, Jiang et al.’s
scheme seems to be a very good candidate authentication protocol for adoption
in practice. Therefore, it is very interesting to analyze this scheme in detail
to ensure that the security claims that are provided by the authors hold. It is
unfortunate that we found some serious ﬂaws in their scheme. In particular,
the scheme is insecure due to two important issues namely the stolen-veriﬁer
attack [17] and it cannot resist against replay attacks.
Our Contributions. The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we show
there exist several serious security ﬂaws in Jiang et al.’s anonymous user authentication scheme, which are described as follows: 1) It is vulnerable to
stolen-veriﬁer attack. An attacker who has stolen the veriﬁer table can obtain
the session key SK and can impersonate the FA to fool the MU. 2) It also
cannot resist replay attacks. Although the attacker cannot get the MU’s session key shared with the FA, he/she can impersonate the MU to login the FA.
3) It is vulnerable to denial of service attack.
Second, we propose a new smart card based anonymous user authentication
protocol for roaming service in global mobility networks. Our protocol makes
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use of a user authentication mechanism which is diﬀerent from the previous
approaches and can successfully prevent diﬀerent kinds of network attacks.
Organization of the Paper. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the
next section, we provide some mathematical preliminaries, which will be used
throughout the paper. In Section 3, we brieﬂy review Jiang et al.’s scheme.
Subsequently, we show its weaknesses in Section 4. Then, we proceed with
proposing our scheme in Section 5, together with analyzing its security in
Section 6. In Section 7, we compare the performance of our new protocol with
the previous schemes. Section 8 concludes the paper.

2 Mathematical Preliminaries
In this section, we discuss three computational problem: Quadratic residue
problem, discrete logarithm problem and computational Diﬃe-Hellman problem, which will be used throughout the paper.

2.1 Quadratic Residue Problem
Assume that n = pq, where p and q are two large primes. If y = x2 mod n has
a solution, i.e., there exists a square root for y, then y is called a quadratic
residue mod n. The set of all quadratic residue numbers in [1, n − 1] is denoted
by QRn . Then the quadratic residue problem states that, for y ∈ QRn , it
is hard to ﬁnd x without the knowledge of p and q due to the diﬃculty of
factoring n [16].

2.2 Discrete Logarithm Problem
Let G be a ﬁnite group, g ∈ G with order n, y ∈ Gg . The problem is to ﬁnd
the smallest integer x ∈ {1, ..., n − 1} such that g x = y (mod n). It is easy to
compute the discrete exponentiation y = g x (mod n) given g, x, n, but it is
computationally infeasible to determine x given y, g, n, when n is large.

2.3 Computational Diﬃe-Hellman Problem
Consider a cyclic group G with order q. The CDH problem states that, given
g, g x , g y for a generator g and random number x, y ∈ {1, 2, ..., q − 1}, it is
computationally intractable to compute the value g xy .
The notations that will be used throughout this paper are listed in Table 1.
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Table 1 Notations
MU
IDM U
P WM U
HA
IDHA
FA
IDF A
x
ctrM U
SK
h(·)
A⊕B
AB

The Mobile user
Identity of MU
Password of MU
Home agent of MU
Identity of HA
Foreign agent of MU roamed
Identity of FA
master secret key stored in HA
A counter of MU
Session key shared between A and B
A secure collision-free one-way hash function
XOR operation of A and B
Data A concatenates with data B

3 Review of Jiang et al.’s scheme
Jiang et al.’s smart card based anonymous authentication scheme comprises
three phases, namely the registration phase, the login and authentication phase
and the password update phase. Each foreign agent shares a unique long-term
KF H with HA.

3.1 Registration Phase
Step 1. The MU sends his/her IDM U to HA via a secure communication
channel. HA computes KM U = h(IDM U x) using the secret random number
x.
Step 2. HA personalizes the smart card with h(·), KM U , n and sends it to MU,
where n is the modulus in the Quadratic Residue Problem.
∗
Step 3. After receiving the smart card, the MU computes KM
U = KM U ⊕
∗
h(IDM U P WM U ) and replaces KM U with KM U . Finally, the smart card con∗
tains h(·), KM
U , n.

3.2 Login and Authentication Phase
Step 1. MU inserts his/her smart card into the device and enters his/her
identity IDM U and password P WM U . The smart card computes KM U =
∗
KM
U ⊕ h(IDM U P WM U ). Then the smart card generates a random number nM U and computes V1 = (IDM U KM U nM U IDF A )2 mod n. Finally,
MU sends a login message M1 = (V1 , IDHA ) to FA.
Step 2. Upon receiving M1 , FA generates a random number nF A and computes V2 = h(M1 nF A KF H ). Subsequently, FA sends the message M2 =
(M1 , IDF A , nF A , V2 ) to HA.
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Step 3. After receiving M2 , HA checks whether IDF A is the identity of an ally.
If it is true, HA compares V2 with V2∗ = h(M1 nF A KF H ). If V2 = V2∗ , HA terminates the protocol. Otherwise, HA solves V1 by using the Chinese Remainder
Theorem with p and q to get IDM U , KM U , nM U , IDF A . Then, HA computes
h(IDM U x) and compares it with the received KM U . If they are equal, the
authenticity of MU is ensured. Also, HA believes FA is the target foreign
agent of MU. After that, HA computes SK = h(h(IDM U x)IDF A nM U
nF A ), V3 = SK ⊕ h(KF H nF A ) and V4 = h(V3 KF H ), where SK is the
session key between FA and MU. Finally, HA sends M3 = (V3 , V4 ) to FA.
Step 4. After receiving the message M3 , FA computes V4∗ = h(V3 KF H ) and
checks whether V4∗ = V4 . If it is valid, FA computes SK = V3 ⊕ h(KF H nF A )
and V5 = h(SKnF A ), and sends M4 = (nF A , V5 ) to MU.
Step 5. Upon receiving M4 , MU computes SK ∗ = h(h(IDM U x)IDF A nM U
nF A ). Then MU computes V5∗ = h(SK ∗ nF A ) and checks whether it is equal
to V5 . If it is true, then MU establishes trust with FA; otherwise, the authentication fails.
3.3 Password Change Phase
When MU wants to renew a password, MU inserts his/her smart card into
∗
the terminal and enters his/her identity IDM
U , the old password P WM U , and
∗∗
∗
the new password P WM U . Then the smart card retrieves KM U = KM
U ⊕
∗
∗∗
∗
∗∗
h(IDM U P WM U ) and computes KM U = KM U ⊕ h(IDM U P WM U ). Finally,
∗∗
∗
the smart card stores KM
U in place of KM U
4 Security Analysis of Jiang et al.’s Scheme
4.1 Security against Stolen-Veriﬁer Attacks
In Jiang et al.’s scheme, it is assumed that each foreign agent shares a unique
long-term key KF H with HA which should be stored in the veriﬁer table of
HA’s database. In case the veriﬁer table in the HA’s database is leaked out or
stolen by an attacker, the attacker can compute SK corresponding to any user
MU and can also proceed to spooﬁng attack. This is illustrated as follows.
4.1.1 Computing SK
Step 1. Eavesdrops a login request message M2 = (M1 , IDF A , nF A , V2 ) and
the corresponding message M3 = (V3 , V4 ).
Step 2. Computes h(KF H nF A ) using the stolen long-term key KF H and nF A .
Step 3. Computes SK = V3 ⊕ h(KF H nF A ).
It can be seen that Jiang et al.’s protocol does not achieve perfect forward
secrecy if the attacker obtains the FA’s long-term key KF H shared with HA.
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4.1.2 Spooﬁng Attack
Step 1. Intercepts a login request message M2 = (M1 , IDF A , nF A , V2 ) and
chooses a random number nF A , and then computes V2 = h(M1 nF A KF H ) using the stolen long-term key KF H and nF A . Sends M2 = (M1 , IDF A , nF A , V2 )
to the HA.
Step 2. The HA authenticates the MU and FA following the step 3 of Jiang
et al.’s scheme and sends message M3 = (V3 , V4 ) to the attacker, where V3 =
SK  ⊕ h(KF H nF A ), V4 = h(V3 KF H ), SK  = h(h(IDM U x)IDF A nM U
nF A ).
Step 3. After receiving the message M3 = (V3 , V4 ), the attacker computes
SK  = V3 ⊕ h(KF H nF A ), V5 = h(SK  nF A ) and sends M4 = (nF A , V5 ) to
the MU.
Step 4. The MU computes SK ∗ = h(h(IDM U x)IDF A nM U nF A ), V5∗ =
h(SK ∗ nF A ) and conforms V5∗ = V5 . The MU believes that the attacker is
the FA.
Hence, it is clear that the attacker can impersonate the FA whenever he/she
likes.

4.2 Security against Replay Attacks
In Jiang et al.’s scheme, during the login and authentication phase, the MU
sends the login message M1 = (V1 , IDHA ) to FA via a public channel, where
V1 = (IDM U KM U nM U IDF A )2 mod n. Suppose an attacker intercepts this
message and sends another message M1 = M1 in the next time to FA. Then
after receiving this message during login and authentication phase, the FA
generates a random number nF A and computes V2 = h(M1 nF A KF H ). Subsequently, FA sends the message M2 = (M1 , IDF A , nF A , V2 ) to HA. After
receiving M2 , then HA also processes this message and ensures that the attacker is a legal user. Although the attacker cannot obtain the session key SK,
he/she can impersonate the MU to login to the FA. As a result, Jiang et al.’s
scheme fails to provide protection against a strong replay attack.

4.3 Security against Denial of Service Attack
In the password change phase, there is no veriﬁcation of old password before
the new password is updated. If an attacker manages to gain temporary access
to MU’s smart card, he/she can launch a denial of service attack as follows:
1) Inserts MU’s smart card into a card reader and initiates a password
change request.
2) Submits two random strings R1 , R2 as MU’s old password and new
password.
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∗∗
3) The smart card computes KM
U = h(IDM U x) ⊕ h(IDM U P WM U ) ⊕
∗
∗∗
h(IDM U R1 ) ⊕ h(IDM U R2 ) and updates KM
U with KM U .
∗
Once the value of KM
U is updated, the MU cannot login successfully even
∗∗
if he/she gets his/her smart card back because KM
U ⊕ h(IDM U P WM U ) =
h(IDM U x), and since then MU’s login request will be denied by HA during
the login and authentication phase.

5 The Proposed Scheme
In this section, we propose a new authentication scheme with privacy preservation for global mobility networks. Notably, the new scheme makes use of a
counter-based authentication mechanism to resist against replay attack. In order to resist against stolen-veriﬁer attack [17], we replace the static long-term
key KF H with a Diﬃe-Hellman key. The new scheme can also resist against a
range of attacks such as oﬄine password guessing attacks and denial of service
attack, even if the smart card is stolen.
Before the system begins, HA generates two secret large primes p, q and
computes the number n = pq. The home agent HA chooses a multiplication
group G and an element g ∈ G with order q  , where p and q  are public large
primes and p = 2q  + 1 is the modulus for the group G (p , q  is diﬀerent
from p, q). The HA selects a private key SHA = a (< q  ) and computes the
public key PHA = g a mod p . Similarly, the foreign agent FA selects a private
key SF A = b (< q  ) and computes the public key PF A = g b mod p . The new
protocol has three phases: registration, login and authentication, and password
change.

5.1 Registration Phase
Step 1. The MU chooses his/her own identity IDM U and password P WM U ,
and generates a large random number d. He/she then computes the hash value
f = h(IDM U P WM U d), and sends the registration message IDM U , f to the
HA via a secure channel.
∗
Step 2. HA computes KM
U = h(IDM U x) ⊕ f using the secret random number x. HA then initiates a counter ctrM U = 0 for MU and creates a record
(IDM U , ctrM U ) in its database. HA then personalizes the smart card with
∗
h(·), KM
U , ctrM U , n and sends it to MU.

Step 3. After receiving the smart card, the MU computes f ∗ = h(IDM U ⊕
P WM U ⊕ d) and stores f ∗ in the smart card. Finally, the smart card contains
∗
∗
h(·), KM
U , f , n, d, ctrM U .
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5.2 Login and Authentication Phase
Step 1. M U → F A : M1 . MU inserts his/her smart card into the device and

enters his/her identity IDM U and password P WM
U . The smart card computes


f = h(IDM U ⊕ P WM U ⊕ d) and veriﬁes whether f ∗ = f  or not. If f ∗ = f  ,
the login phase terminates immediately. Otherwise, the smart card computes
∗
KM U = K M
U ⊕ h(IDM U P WM U d). Then MU generates a random number
nM U and computes ctrM U = ctrM U + 1, V1 = (IDM U KM U nM U ctrM U
IDF A )2 mod n. Finally, MU sends a login message M1 = (V1 , ctrM U , IDHA )
to FA.
b
Step 2. F A → HA : M2 . FA computes K = PHA
mod p = g ab mod p , V2 =
h(V1 ctrM U K). Subsequently, FA sends the message M2 = (M1 , IDF A , V2 )
to HA.

Step 3. HA → F A : M3 . HA checks whether IDF A is the identity of an
ally. If it is true, HA compares K = PFa A mod p = g ab mod p and V2∗ =
h(V1 ctrM U K). If V2 = V2∗ , HA terminates the protocol. Otherwise, HA
solves V1 by using the Chinese Remainder Theorem with p and q to get
IDM U , KM U , nM U , ctrM U , IDF A . Then, the HA veriﬁes the retrieved ctrM U


with the stored ctrM
U corresponding to IDM U . If ctrM U > ctrM U , then the
HA proceeds to the next step. Otherwise, the HA rejects this message and
considers it as a replayed message. After that, HA computes h(IDM U x) and
compares it with the received KM U . If they are equal, the authenticity of

MU is ensured, and the HA replaces ctrM
U with the new counter ctrM U in
its database. Also, HA believes FA is the target foreign agent of MU. HA
computes SK = h(h(IDM U x)IDF A nM U ctrM U ), V3 = SK ⊕ h(K) and
V4 = h(V3 K), where SK is the session key between FA and MU. Finally, HA
sends M3 = (V3 , V4 ) to FA.
Step 4. F A → M U : M4 . FA computes V4∗ = h(V3 K) and checks whether
V4∗ = V4 . If it is valid, FA computes SK = V3 ⊕ h(K) and V5 = h(SKPF A ),
and sends M4 = V5 to MU.
Step 5. Upon receiving M4 , MU computes SK ∗ = h(h(IDM U x)IDF A nM U
ctrM U ). Then MU computes V5∗ = h(SK ∗ PF A ) and checks whether V5∗ =
V5 . If they are equal, then MU establishes trust with FA; otherwise, the authentication fails.

5.3 Password Change Phase
When MU wants to renew a password, MU inserts his/her smart card into the
old
terminal and enters his/her identity IDM U , the old password P WM
U , and the
new

old
new password P WM U . The smart card computes f = h(IDM U ⊕P WM
U ⊕d),
∗

∗

and then veriﬁes whether f = f or not. If f = f , the password change phase
∗
is terminated immediately. Otherwise, the smart card retrieves KM U = KM
U⊕
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MU

FA

M1 = (V1 , ctrM U , IDHA )



M4 = V5

HA

-

M2 = (M1 , IDF A , V2 )



-

M3 = (V3 , V4 )

Fig. 1 Message Flows in login and Authentication Phase.
old
∗∗
new
h(IDM U P WM
U d) and computes KM U = KM U ⊕ h(IDM U P WM U d). Fi∗∗
∗
nally, the smart card stores KM U in place of KM U .

6 Security Analysis of The Proposed Scheme
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed scheme and show that
it can resist diﬀerent types of attacks and also provides user anonymity.

6.1 User Anonymity
It is very important and necessary for a secure authentication protocol to provide user anonymity [3, 5]. From Figure 1, we can see that the communication
transcript reveals no information about the identity IDM U of the user. In
fact, IDM U is concealed in V1 , only the person who knows the value of p, q
can solve the quadratic residue problem to obtain IDM U . In our scheme, the
secret value p, q is stored by HA. Therefore, the attacker including the FA
cannot identify the MU from the login message.

6.2 Security against Replay Attacks [18]
In our scheme, we used the counter based authentication mechanism to prevent
replay attacks. If the adversary replays the previous login message, then HA
will detect the attack when examining the counter ctrM U of the user MU. The
concrete step is as follows: During the login and authentication phase, when
the HA receives a message M2 = (M1 , IDF A , V2 ), it veriﬁes the retrieved

counter ctrM U with the stored counter ctrM
U corresponding to the IDM U . If



the message M2 = (M1 , IDF A , V2 ) is a replayed message, then the HA will

ﬁnd that ctrM
U ≥ ctrM U . The HA will simply reject this message. Hence, our
scheme prevents the replay attacks through the use of counter.

6.3 Security against Impersonation Attacks [15]
We consider three types of impersonation attacks, namely MU impersonation
attack, FA impersonation attack, and HA impersonation attack.
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M U Impersonation. In order to impersonate the MU, the adversary must
obtain the value of IDM U , KM U . We then consider two situations: (1) the
adversary compromises the user identity and password but the smart card is
secure; and (2) the adversary compromises the smart card but the user identity
and password are secure.
In the ﬁrst case, it is obvious that adversary is unable to obtain the value
of KM U since the smart card is secure. Notice that KM U is concealed in
∗
KM
U = KM U ⊕ h(IDM U P WM U d) in the smart card. Since the smart card
∗
is secure, the adversary is unable to obtain (KM
U , d) or KM U .
In the second case, when the smart card is stolen and compromised, the
∗
∗
adversary can learn the values of (h(·), KM
U , f , n, d, ctrM U ) in the smart
card. However, this time the adversary knows neither IDM U nor P WM U , and
again he/she cannot computes the value of KM U . We must also consider oﬄine
password guessing attacks in this case, that is the adversary uses a brute force
search to ﬁnd out the correct password. Let the adversary select randomly


an identity candidate IDM
U and a password candidate P WM U . Then the



adversary can compute f = h(IDM U ⊕ P WM U ⊕ d) and then compare f 


with f ∗ . If they are equal, the adversary may think that P WM
U and IDM U
as the correct password and real identity of the MU. In fact, the message pair


(IDM
U , P WM U ) which satisfy the above equality is not unique. Even if this
attack can be carried out in the oﬄine manner by repeatedly trying the next
identity candidate and password candidate, it is still a diﬃcult problem for
the adversary to obtain the real IDM U , P WM U of the MU.
F A/HA Impersonation. Since FA and HA use Diﬃe-Hellman keys to authenticate each other, the adversary is unable to impersonate either of them
due to the intractability of the Diﬃe-Hellman problem. Also, the attacker
cannot impersonates FA to fool MU. Since he/she does not posses the secret x and IDM U , nM U , the attacker cannot compute V5 = h(SKPF A ) =
h(h(h(IDM U x)IDF A nM U ctrM U )PF A ). On the other hand, it is impossible for him/her to obtain the session key SK by computing SK = V3 ⊕ h(K)
due to the diﬃculty of solving Diﬃe-Hellman problem.

6.4 Secure Key Establishment [15]
At the end of the protocol, the MU, FA and HA will establish a common
session key SK = h(h(IDM U x)IDF A nM U ctrM U ). Since the attacker does
not know the value of x, he/she cannot compute the SK directly. Even if
the previous session keys are disclosed, the attacker cannot obtain any future
session key due to the security of one-way hash function.

6.5 Protection against Attacks in Section 4
In this section, we show how our new scheme overcomes the security weaknesses
presented in Section 4.
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1) In our proposed scheme, there is no veriﬁer table in HA’s database to
store the secret information of MU or FA. Thus, the attacker cannot launch
stolen-veriﬁer attack [17].
2) In order to prevent replay attack [18], we used the counter based authentication mechanism. HA can detect the attack by examining the counter
ctrM U of the user MU.
3) In order to prevent denial of service attack [25], the smart card will
verify whether the P WM U entered by MU is correct or not in the login phase
and password update phase.

7 Performance Comparison
We compare our new scheme with two recently proposed smart card based
anonymous user authentication schemes due to He et al. [8] and Jiang et al.
[9]. In Table 2, we provide the comparison based on the key security of these
schemes, while we compare their eﬃciency in terms of computation and communication cost in Table 3. The following notation are used in Table 3. th : The
time complexity of the hash computation; tm : The time complexity of the modular squaring computation; tqr : The time complexity of computing a square
root modulo n; tme : The time complexity of computing modular exponentiation; tsym : The time complexity of symmetric encryption/decryption; tasym :
The time complexity of encryption/decryption or signature using asymmetric
cryptosystem.
From Table 2, we can conclude that our proposed scheme provides better
security and usability than the other two schemes. He et al.’s scheme [8] does
not satisfy any of the criteria listed in table 2. Jiang et.al.’s scheme [9] does
not satisfy four of the nine criteria. Our scheme can achieve all the criteria
listed in table 2. In particular, one special feature of our scheme is that we do
not require the HA to store some secret information that is shared with FA
in his/her database, which enhances our scheme’s security strength to resist
against diﬀerent attacks.
In Table 3, we summarize the eﬃciency comparison between our scheme
and other schemes in [9, 8]. From the table 3, it is easy to see that our scheme is
more eﬃcient than He et al.’s scheme [8]. Our scheme requires two extra Modular Exponentiation for FA and HA as compared with Jiang et al.’s scheme.
It is not a problem because the FA and the HA are powerful servers. On the
other hand, our scheme achieves stronger security than the previous solutions,
as is shown in Table 2.

8 Conclusion
In this paper, we discussed several security weaknesses in a recently proposed
smart card based privacy preservation user authentication scheme by Jiang et
al. We showed that this scheme is vulnerable to stolen-veriﬁer attacks, replay
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Table 2 Security and Usability Comparison
Feature
Correct Password Update
Stolen-veriﬁer-table resistance
User Anonymity
Mutual Authentication
Strong Replay Resistance
Key Agreement
Password protection
Two-factor security
Denial of service resistance

He et al. [8]
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Jiang [9]
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Ours
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Table 3 Eﬃciency Comparison
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
C7

C1:
C2:
C3:
C4:
C5:
C6:
C7:

Jiang et al. [9]
3th + tm
4th
5th + tqr
1
1
4
6

He et al. [8]
10th + 2tsym
th + tasym
4th + 2tsym + 4tasym
1
1
5
6

Ours
3th + tm
3th + tme
5th + tme + tqr
1
1
4
5

Computation cost of the MU
Computation cost of the FA
Computation cost of the HA
Communication rounds between the MU and FA
Communication rounds between the FA and HA
Total messages transmitted between the MU and FA
Total messages transmitted between the FA and HA

attacks, and denial of service attack. In order to withstand its security ﬂaws,
subsequntly we proposed a new smart card based user authentication scheme
with user’s anonymity for roaming service which can achieve stronger security.
Our scheme does not require HA to store a veriﬁer-table in its database and
uses counter based authentication mechanism to prevent replay attacks.
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